China’s ballooning current account surplus has caused a plethora of adverse effects on the healthy development of its economy.Based on an in-depth analysis of the contributory factors to the swelling current account ...China’s ballooning current account surplus has caused a plethora of adverse effects on the healthy development of its economy.Based on an in-depth analysis of the contributory factors to the swelling current account surplus,this paper purports to demonstrate theoretically and empirically that while the chronic savings-consumption imbalance is an important contributor to China’s huge trade surplus,the fundamental underlying contributor is the income structure and savings structure imbalance stemming from the disproportionate increase in retained earnings relative to stagnant wage bills.Corporate retained earnings keep growing rapidly because corporate profit margins are"overstated"and state-owned enterprises"do not pay dividends."Only when these issues are resolved at the institutional level can the savings rate be reduced to an appropriate level with domestic demand boosted to eliminate excess trade surpluses and fundamentally fix internal and external economic imbalances.展开更多
It is generally accepted that governments favor expansive fiscal policies to address an economic scenario in which supply exceeds demand. In other words, economic imbalance is regarded as the cause of the problem and ...It is generally accepted that governments favor expansive fiscal policies to address an economic scenario in which supply exceeds demand. In other words, economic imbalance is regarded as the cause of the problem and fiscal expansion as the result. However, this paper posits that China＇s expansive fiscal policies may also be a major cause of its economic imbalance, and that fiscal expansion and economic imbalance create cumulative causation. Specifically, China＇s tax system, characterized by a regressive commodity tax, intensifies constraints on domestic consumption while distributing a large proportion of national income to government and enterprises; supply-demand imbalance prompts the government to expand fiscal expenditures and increase taxes, which further exacerbates this imbalance. Thus, even as the country faces a macroeconomic imbalance, the strong measures it adopts in response may stimulate economic growth in the short term, but in the long term, they may do exactly the opposite and create the next economic crisis.展开更多
This paper uses the data from the post-1994 tax reform in China to investigate the vertical and spatial structures of sub-provincial fiscal expenditure decentralization(SPFED)in China.The study shows that,on the whole...This paper uses the data from the post-1994 tax reform in China to investigate the vertical and spatial structures of sub-provincial fiscal expenditure decentralization(SPFED)in China.The study shows that,on the whole,SPFED tends to be gradually biased toward the county level,but inter-provincial differences are obvious,and the provincial centralization is more obvious in less economically developed regions.In terms of expenditure items,the province level enjoys a relatively higher level of economic expenditure decentralization(EED),and the county level enjoys a higher level of social expenditure decentralization(SED).In terms of internal structure,the difference in the level of EED shared by the province,prefecture and county levels is relatively smaller and the difference in the level of SED is relatively larger.In terms of spatial structure,in less developed regions,the province level enjoys a higher EED but a lower SED;in developed regions,the prefecture and county levels enjoy a higher EED but the prefecture level enjoys a relatively lower SED.These findings can provide empirical evidence for the reform of the division of power and expenditure responsibility,as well as the governance of sub-provincial governments.展开更多
Accelerating the construction of modern fiscal and tax system helps not only free local governments from the shackle of the“competition for growth”development model,but also improve the governance capacity of local ...Accelerating the construction of modern fiscal and tax system helps not only free local governments from the shackle of the“competition for growth”development model,but also improve the governance capacity of local governments and realize the good governance of the country in the long term.Firstly,based on the typical fact of Chinese-style fiscal decentralization,this paper theoretically interprets the multiple channels and influencing mechanisms among vertical fiscal imbalance,transfer payment and local government governance.Secondly,it constructs a comprehensive index system to measure the governance capacity of local governments.The result shows that local government governance is relatively low in capacity and slow in improvement,and displays obvious regional heterogeneity.Then,the paper chooses structure and scale of transfer payment as mediator to construct the panel simultaneous equation model,and uses the three-stage least squares estimation(3SLS)for empirical investigation.The study finds that first,both the scale and structure of transfer payment may significantly affect local government governance,but the direction of the effects is opposite;second,the intensified vertical fiscal imbalance and the increase of transfer payment in scale can significantly inhibit local government governance,but the optimization of transfer payment in structure can significantly improve the governance;third,vertical fiscal imbalance not only directly inhibits the improvement of local government governance,but indirectly impedes it through the scale and structure of transfer payment.展开更多
基金funded and supported by the China Reform Foundation and the Ministry of Commerce
文摘China’s ballooning current account surplus has caused a plethora of adverse effects on the healthy development of its economy.Based on an in-depth analysis of the contributory factors to the swelling current account surplus,this paper purports to demonstrate theoretically and empirically that while the chronic savings-consumption imbalance is an important contributor to China’s huge trade surplus,the fundamental underlying contributor is the income structure and savings structure imbalance stemming from the disproportionate increase in retained earnings relative to stagnant wage bills.Corporate retained earnings keep growing rapidly because corporate profit margins are"overstated"and state-owned enterprises"do not pay dividends."Only when these issues are resolved at the institutional level can the savings rate be reduced to an appropriate level with domestic demand boosted to eliminate excess trade surpluses and fundamentally fix internal and external economic imbalances.
文摘It is generally accepted that governments favor expansive fiscal policies to address an economic scenario in which supply exceeds demand. In other words, economic imbalance is regarded as the cause of the problem and fiscal expansion as the result. However, this paper posits that China＇s expansive fiscal policies may also be a major cause of its economic imbalance, and that fiscal expansion and economic imbalance create cumulative causation. Specifically, China＇s tax system, characterized by a regressive commodity tax, intensifies constraints on domestic consumption while distributing a large proportion of national income to government and enterprises; supply-demand imbalance prompts the government to expand fiscal expenditures and increase taxes, which further exacerbates this imbalance. Thus, even as the country faces a macroeconomic imbalance, the strong measures it adopts in response may stimulate economic growth in the short term, but in the long term, they may do exactly the opposite and create the next economic crisis.
文摘This paper uses the data from the post-1994 tax reform in China to investigate the vertical and spatial structures of sub-provincial fiscal expenditure decentralization(SPFED)in China.The study shows that,on the whole,SPFED tends to be gradually biased toward the county level,but inter-provincial differences are obvious,and the provincial centralization is more obvious in less economically developed regions.In terms of expenditure items,the province level enjoys a relatively higher level of economic expenditure decentralization(EED),and the county level enjoys a higher level of social expenditure decentralization(SED).In terms of internal structure,the difference in the level of EED shared by the province,prefecture and county levels is relatively smaller and the difference in the level of SED is relatively larger.In terms of spatial structure,in less developed regions,the province level enjoys a higher EED but a lower SED;in developed regions,the prefecture and county levels enjoy a higher EED but the prefecture level enjoys a relatively lower SED.These findings can provide empirical evidence for the reform of the division of power and expenditure responsibility,as well as the governance of sub-provincial governments.
基金Post-Funded Program of the National Social Science Fund of China“Study on Vertical Fiscal Imbalance and Reconstruction of Transfer Payment Incentive Mechanisms”(19FJB035).
文摘Accelerating the construction of modern fiscal and tax system helps not only free local governments from the shackle of the“competition for growth”development model,but also improve the governance capacity of local governments and realize the good governance of the country in the long term.Firstly,based on the typical fact of Chinese-style fiscal decentralization,this paper theoretically interprets the multiple channels and influencing mechanisms among vertical fiscal imbalance,transfer payment and local government governance.Secondly,it constructs a comprehensive index system to measure the governance capacity of local governments.The result shows that local government governance is relatively low in capacity and slow in improvement,and displays obvious regional heterogeneity.Then,the paper chooses structure and scale of transfer payment as mediator to construct the panel simultaneous equation model,and uses the three-stage least squares estimation(3SLS)for empirical investigation.The study finds that first,both the scale and structure of transfer payment may significantly affect local government governance,but the direction of the effects is opposite;second,the intensified vertical fiscal imbalance and the increase of transfer payment in scale can significantly inhibit local government governance,but the optimization of transfer payment in structure can significantly improve the governance;third,vertical fiscal imbalance not only directly inhibits the improvement of local government governance,but indirectly impedes it through the scale and structure of transfer payment.
