This paper studies the occurrence, characteristics, and governance mechanism of the holdout problem during market-oriented urban renewal in Shenzhen after a related foreign experience analysis, through methodologies o...This paper studies the occurrence, characteristics, and governance mechanism of the holdout problem during market-oriented urban renewal in Shenzhen after a related foreign experience analysis, through methodologies of logical analysis and case study.The results indicate that the holdout problem is almost an inevitable result of market-oriented urban renewal, and its proliferation not only goes against social morality and the principle of justice, but also harms social public interests, and even causes market failure.The paper proposes two approaches to dealing with holdout problem: first, to introduce the contracting commitment to restrict the owners’ freedom of contract, and to guarantee the public benefit of all owners;second, to introduce land expropriation right to regulate holdout behavior via authority of state.展开更多
基金supported by the Open Fund of Key Laboratory of Urban Land Resources Monitoring and Simulation,Ministry of Land and Resources(No.KF-2015-01-004)
文摘This paper studies the occurrence, characteristics, and governance mechanism of the holdout problem during market-oriented urban renewal in Shenzhen after a related foreign experience analysis, through methodologies of logical analysis and case study.The results indicate that the holdout problem is almost an inevitable result of market-oriented urban renewal, and its proliferation not only goes against social morality and the principle of justice, but also harms social public interests, and even causes market failure.The paper proposes two approaches to dealing with holdout problem: first, to introduce the contracting commitment to restrict the owners’ freedom of contract, and to guarantee the public benefit of all owners;second, to introduce land expropriation right to regulate holdout behavior via authority of state.
