处于供应链的末端,直接面向市场的零售商面临激烈的市场竞争。供应链中零售商之间的竞争普遍存在,零售价格是竞争的主要决定因素,除了价格,由于当前的动态和市场环境,零售商必须采用更复杂的策略来竞争,而不是简单地降低零售价格。零售...处于供应链的末端,直接面向市场的零售商面临激烈的市场竞争。供应链中零售商之间的竞争普遍存在,零售价格是竞争的主要决定因素,除了价格,由于当前的动态和市场环境,零售商必须采用更复杂的策略来竞争,而不是简单地降低零售价格。零售商还必须考虑一些非价格因素,如进行企业社会责任投入(Corporate Social Responsibility,CSR)。今天的人们对CSR的认知渐深,企业正通过不同的方式履行CSR。文章研究两个竞争型零售商在不同的CSR投入模式下供应链最优定价决策,首先,构建分散决策下,两零售商考虑不同CSR投入模式的博弈模型。接着,对比分析了各模式下供应链成员的最优决策,探讨了CSR投入水平在供应链定价决策中的作用,总结出最优的CSR投入策略。展开更多
Recently, price contract models between suppliers and retailers, with stochastic demand have been analyzed based on well-known newsvendor problems. In Bernstein and Federgruen [6], they have analyzed a contract model ...Recently, price contract models between suppliers and retailers, with stochastic demand have been analyzed based on well-known newsvendor problems. In Bernstein and Federgruen [6], they have analyzed a contract model with single supplier and multiples retailers and price dependent demand, where retailers compete on retail prices. Each retailer decides a number of products he procures from the supplier and his retail price to maximize his own profit. This is achieved after giving the wholesale and buy-back prices, which are determined by the supplier as the supplier’s profit is maximized. Bernstein and Federgruen have proved that the retail prices become a unique Nash equilibrium solution under weak conditions on the price dependent distribution of demand. The authors, however, have not mentioned the numerical values and proprieties on these retail prices, the number of products and their individual and overall profits. In this paper, we analyze the model numerically. We first indicate some numerical problems with respect to theorem of Nash equilibrium solutions, which Bernstein and Federgruen proved, and we show their modified results. Then, we compute numerically Nash equilibrium prices, optimal wholesale and buy-back prices for the supplier’s and retailers’ profits, and supply chain optimal retailers’ prices. We also discuss properties on relation between these values and the demand distribution.展开更多
文摘处于供应链的末端,直接面向市场的零售商面临激烈的市场竞争。供应链中零售商之间的竞争普遍存在,零售价格是竞争的主要决定因素,除了价格,由于当前的动态和市场环境,零售商必须采用更复杂的策略来竞争,而不是简单地降低零售价格。零售商还必须考虑一些非价格因素,如进行企业社会责任投入(Corporate Social Responsibility,CSR)。今天的人们对CSR的认知渐深,企业正通过不同的方式履行CSR。文章研究两个竞争型零售商在不同的CSR投入模式下供应链最优定价决策,首先,构建分散决策下,两零售商考虑不同CSR投入模式的博弈模型。接着,对比分析了各模式下供应链成员的最优决策,探讨了CSR投入水平在供应链定价决策中的作用,总结出最优的CSR投入策略。
文摘Recently, price contract models between suppliers and retailers, with stochastic demand have been analyzed based on well-known newsvendor problems. In Bernstein and Federgruen [6], they have analyzed a contract model with single supplier and multiples retailers and price dependent demand, where retailers compete on retail prices. Each retailer decides a number of products he procures from the supplier and his retail price to maximize his own profit. This is achieved after giving the wholesale and buy-back prices, which are determined by the supplier as the supplier’s profit is maximized. Bernstein and Federgruen have proved that the retail prices become a unique Nash equilibrium solution under weak conditions on the price dependent distribution of demand. The authors, however, have not mentioned the numerical values and proprieties on these retail prices, the number of products and their individual and overall profits. In this paper, we analyze the model numerically. We first indicate some numerical problems with respect to theorem of Nash equilibrium solutions, which Bernstein and Federgruen proved, and we show their modified results. Then, we compute numerically Nash equilibrium prices, optimal wholesale and buy-back prices for the supplier’s and retailers’ profits, and supply chain optimal retailers’ prices. We also discuss properties on relation between these values and the demand distribution.
