This paper presents theoretical analysis of how career concerns and shareholder monitoring affect chief executive officer(CEO) agency costs. We investigate investment efficiency prior to CEO retirement based on a samp...This paper presents theoretical analysis of how career concerns and shareholder monitoring affect chief executive officer(CEO) agency costs. We investigate investment efficiency prior to CEO retirement based on a sample of Chinese state-owned enterprises(SOEs) during the 1999–2007 period and find that there is a significant decline in investment efficiency prior to CEO retirement, relative to other periods, and that this decline becomes less significant under stronger shareholder supervision. Our research furthers understanding of the significance of SOE incentive and monitoring mechanisms.展开更多
基金support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Nos.70972060,71102013 and 71272008)National Accounting Leader(Reserve)Personnel Training Plan(Academic Class)+3 种基金Humanities and Social Science Research Foundation of the Ministry of Education of China(Nos.11JJD790008,13YJC790041 and 14JJD630005)Innovation Program of the Shanghai Municipal Education Commission(Nos.11ZS186 and 14ZS157)the "Shu Guang" project supported by the Shanghai Municipal Education Commission and Shanghai Education Development Foundation(No.10SG54)the "211" Key Project of the Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
文摘This paper presents theoretical analysis of how career concerns and shareholder monitoring affect chief executive officer(CEO) agency costs. We investigate investment efficiency prior to CEO retirement based on a sample of Chinese state-owned enterprises(SOEs) during the 1999–2007 period and find that there is a significant decline in investment efficiency prior to CEO retirement, relative to other periods, and that this decline becomes less significant under stronger shareholder supervision. Our research furthers understanding of the significance of SOE incentive and monitoring mechanisms.
