In this paper, a general framework for designing and analyzing password-based security protocols is presented. First we introduce the concept of ＂weak computational indistinguishability＂ based on current progress of...In this paper, a general framework for designing and analyzing password-based security protocols is presented. First we introduce the concept of ＂weak computational indistinguishability＂ based on current progress of password-based security protocols. Then, we focus on cryptographic foundations for password-based security protocols, i.e., the theory of ＂weak pseudorandomness＂. Furthermore, based on the theory of weak pseudorandomness, we present a modular approach to design and analysis of password-based security protocols. Finally, applying the modular approach, we design two kinds of password-based security protocols, i.e., password-based session key distribution （PSKD） protocol and protected password change （PPC） protocol. In addition to having forward secrecy and improved efficiency, new protocols are proved secure.展开更多
We demonstrate the flaws of Mao's method, which is an augmentation ofprotocol idealization in BAN-like logics, and then offer some new idealization rules based on Mao'smethod. Furthermore, we give some theoret...We demonstrate the flaws of Mao's method, which is an augmentation ofprotocol idealization in BAN-like logics, and then offer some new idealization rules based on Mao'smethod. Furthermore, we give some theoretical analysis of our rules using the strand spaceformalism, and show the soundness of our idealization rules under strand spaces Some examples onusing the new rules to analyze security protocols are also concerned. Our idealization method ismore effective than Mao's method towards many protocol instances, and is supported by a formalmodel.展开更多
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 60025205 and 60673083)
文摘In this paper, a general framework for designing and analyzing password-based security protocols is presented. First we introduce the concept of ＂weak computational indistinguishability＂ based on current progress of password-based security protocols. Then, we focus on cryptographic foundations for password-based security protocols, i.e., the theory of ＂weak pseudorandomness＂. Furthermore, based on the theory of weak pseudorandomness, we present a modular approach to design and analysis of password-based security protocols. Finally, applying the modular approach, we design two kinds of password-based security protocols, i.e., password-based session key distribution （PSKD） protocol and protected password change （PPC） protocol. In addition to having forward secrecy and improved efficiency, new protocols are proved secure.
文摘We demonstrate the flaws of Mao's method, which is an augmentation ofprotocol idealization in BAN-like logics, and then offer some new idealization rules based on Mao'smethod. Furthermore, we give some theoretical analysis of our rules using the strand spaceformalism, and show the soundness of our idealization rules under strand spaces Some examples onusing the new rules to analyze security protocols are also concerned. Our idealization method ismore effective than Mao's method towards many protocol instances, and is supported by a formalmodel.
