本文以土耳其新宪法为依据,采用马修·S.舒加特(Mattew Soberg Shugart)、约翰·M.凯里(John M. Carey)等学者提出的量化测量方法并加以适当修正,形成量表评估土耳其总统的权力:即总统权力不仅要衡量其正式权力,还要考量其非正...本文以土耳其新宪法为依据,采用马修·S.舒加特(Mattew Soberg Shugart)、约翰·M.凯里(John M. Carey)等学者提出的量化测量方法并加以适当修正,形成量表评估土耳其总统的权力:即总统权力不仅要衡量其正式权力,还要考量其非正式权力;前者取决于宪法设计中的权力归属,后者则与政党制度、权力制衡等政治过程有关。并与美国、俄罗斯、法国和韩国等代表性的总统制国家进行比较。结果显示,土耳其总统享有极大的立法性权力和非立法性权力,呈现出与俄罗斯超级总统制类似的特点;土耳其新宪法设计中缺少对总统强有力的制衡机制。研究表明,影响民主的发展不在于实行的是总统制还是议会制,关键在于制度设计时能否融入权力制衡机制。展开更多
The introduction of presidential term limits was one of the outcomes of the various negotiations that preceded the post-Cold War transition elections in Africa. With constitutional support for presidential term limits...The introduction of presidential term limits was one of the outcomes of the various negotiations that preceded the post-Cold War transition elections in Africa. With constitutional support for presidential term limits, which were often ratified in most African countries through a referendum, presidential term limits not only assumed a democratic principle, but were also expected to become both a ＂process and practice＂ in new African democracies.1 The constitution legitimizes term limits （years and tenures） as a democratic principle to regulate power and leadership transition within the context of democratic elections. Shinn （2009） argues that term limits for a country＇s most important political leader are an essential component of building democracy. Their importance adds value to the process, practice and constitutive feature of liberal democracy （Shinn, 2009）. Numerous studies show that presidential term limits are one of the most consistent predictors of power transition （Beetham, 1994; Linz, 1996a; Cheeseman, 2010）. Presidential term limits are also important in sustaining open-seat contests that ensure power alternation. However, this was not to be the case in African democratic experiment, where the process and practice of presidential term limits have become problematic. This paper focuses on how the removal of presidential term limits has worked against the consolidation of democracy in African post-Cold War democratic experiment, resulting in weak institutions, entrenchment and reconsolidation of power by long serving dictators, democratic hybridity and sometimes democratic reversal.展开更多
文摘本文以土耳其新宪法为依据,采用马修·S.舒加特(Mattew Soberg Shugart)、约翰·M.凯里(John M. Carey)等学者提出的量化测量方法并加以适当修正,形成量表评估土耳其总统的权力:即总统权力不仅要衡量其正式权力,还要考量其非正式权力;前者取决于宪法设计中的权力归属,后者则与政党制度、权力制衡等政治过程有关。并与美国、俄罗斯、法国和韩国等代表性的总统制国家进行比较。结果显示,土耳其总统享有极大的立法性权力和非立法性权力,呈现出与俄罗斯超级总统制类似的特点;土耳其新宪法设计中缺少对总统强有力的制衡机制。研究表明,影响民主的发展不在于实行的是总统制还是议会制,关键在于制度设计时能否融入权力制衡机制。
文摘The introduction of presidential term limits was one of the outcomes of the various negotiations that preceded the post-Cold War transition elections in Africa. With constitutional support for presidential term limits, which were often ratified in most African countries through a referendum, presidential term limits not only assumed a democratic principle, but were also expected to become both a ＂process and practice＂ in new African democracies.1 The constitution legitimizes term limits （years and tenures） as a democratic principle to regulate power and leadership transition within the context of democratic elections. Shinn （2009） argues that term limits for a country＇s most important political leader are an essential component of building democracy. Their importance adds value to the process, practice and constitutive feature of liberal democracy （Shinn, 2009）. Numerous studies show that presidential term limits are one of the most consistent predictors of power transition （Beetham, 1994; Linz, 1996a; Cheeseman, 2010）. Presidential term limits are also important in sustaining open-seat contests that ensure power alternation. However, this was not to be the case in African democratic experiment, where the process and practice of presidential term limits have become problematic. This paper focuses on how the removal of presidential term limits has worked against the consolidation of democracy in African post-Cold War democratic experiment, resulting in weak institutions, entrenchment and reconsolidation of power by long serving dictators, democratic hybridity and sometimes democratic reversal.
