The licensing strategies and innovation incentives of downstream firms in a Stackelberg duopoly model were analyzed under three respective assumptions that upstream industry is monopoly, duopoly, or perfect competitio...The licensing strategies and innovation incentives of downstream firms in a Stackelberg duopoly model were analyzed under three respective assumptions that upstream industry is monopoly, duopoly, or perfect competition. It is found that the Stackelberg firm may license his drastic innovation by a fixed royalty rate which is lower than innovalion size. The incentives of drastic innovation of Stackelberg firm facing input suppfiers with market power decrease considerably even onder royalty licensing, compared with facing perfectly competitive input market.展开更多
More and more marketplace platforms choose to use the data gathered from consumers(e.g.,customer search terms,demographics)to provide a data analytics service for third-party sellers,both encouraging innovations and i...More and more marketplace platforms choose to use the data gathered from consumers(e.g.,customer search terms,demographics)to provide a data analytics service for third-party sellers,both encouraging innovations and improving the operations of the latter.Through adopting the data analytics service,a seller can enhance its competitiveness by improving the quality of its products when there is more than one seller offering substitutes.This study develops a game-theoretic model to characterize a scenario with a marketplace platform and two competing sellers that sell substitutable products and decide whether to adopt the data analytics service provided by the platform.Then,we find that a seller's decision of whether or not to purchase the service depends on the competitor's decision and the two sellers'absorptive capacities of knowledge.Furthermore,a seller can benefit from adopting the data analytics service only if the seller has a high absorptive capacity,which can help increase product quality.When only one seller adopts,the platform and competing sellers can benefit from the adoption if this seller's absorptive capacity is high and the other's is moderate.The sellers'interests and social welfare can be aligned unless both sellers'absorptive capacities are low or high.展开更多
文摘The licensing strategies and innovation incentives of downstream firms in a Stackelberg duopoly model were analyzed under three respective assumptions that upstream industry is monopoly, duopoly, or perfect competition. It is found that the Stackelberg firm may license his drastic innovation by a fixed royalty rate which is lower than innovalion size. The incentives of drastic innovation of Stackelberg firm facing input suppfiers with market power decrease considerably even onder royalty licensing, compared with facing perfectly competitive input market.
基金supported by the Major Program of National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.72394373)the National Excellent Youth Fund of National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.72022012)the Key Program and General Program of National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.72231004,No.71871155 and No.71971153).Authors are very grateful to the editor and all reviewers whose invaluable comments and suggestions substantially helped improve the quality of our paper.
文摘More and more marketplace platforms choose to use the data gathered from consumers(e.g.,customer search terms,demographics)to provide a data analytics service for third-party sellers,both encouraging innovations and improving the operations of the latter.Through adopting the data analytics service,a seller can enhance its competitiveness by improving the quality of its products when there is more than one seller offering substitutes.This study develops a game-theoretic model to characterize a scenario with a marketplace platform and two competing sellers that sell substitutable products and decide whether to adopt the data analytics service provided by the platform.Then,we find that a seller's decision of whether or not to purchase the service depends on the competitor's decision and the two sellers'absorptive capacities of knowledge.Furthermore,a seller can benefit from adopting the data analytics service only if the seller has a high absorptive capacity,which can help increase product quality.When only one seller adopts,the platform and competing sellers can benefit from the adoption if this seller's absorptive capacity is high and the other's is moderate.The sellers'interests and social welfare can be aligned unless both sellers'absorptive capacities are low or high.
