随着人们隐私保护意识的提高,匿名通信系统获得了越来越多的关注.I2P(invisible Internet project)是当前应用最广泛的匿名通信系统之一,与Tor(另一种非常流行的匿名通信系统)网络类似,I2P采用大蒜路由的方式隐藏通信双方的通信关系,即...随着人们隐私保护意识的提高,匿名通信系统获得了越来越多的关注.I2P(invisible Internet project)是当前应用最广泛的匿名通信系统之一,与Tor(另一种非常流行的匿名通信系统)网络类似,I2P采用大蒜路由的方式隐藏通信双方的通信关系,即通过使用包含多个节点的隧道,使得隧道中的任意单一节点都不能同时获知通信双方的身份信息.然而,如果能够共谋同一隧道的两端节点或是能同时观察到I2P通信链路进、出I2P网络的流量,攻击者依然可以通过流量分析的方法对通信的双方进行关联,进而破坏I2P网络的匿名性.通过分别从I2P网络内部攻击者和传输路径上外部网络攻击者的角度,对当前I2P路径选择过程中可能面临的共谋攻击威胁进行分析,结果显示,I2P网络当前的路径选择算法并不能有效地防范内部攻击者和外部网络攻击者,I2P网络的匿名性仍然面临着巨大的共谋攻击威胁.展开更多
BGP monitors are currently the main data resource of AS-level topology measurement,and the integrity of measurement result is limited to the location of such BGP monitors.However,there is currently no work to conduct ...BGP monitors are currently the main data resource of AS-level topology measurement,and the integrity of measurement result is limited to the location of such BGP monitors.However,there is currently no work to conduct a comprehensive study of the range of measurement results for a single BGP monitor.In this paper,we take the first step to describe the observed topology of each BGP monitor.To that end,we first investigate the construction and theoretical up-limit of the measured topology of a BGP monitor based on the valley-free model,then we evaluate the individual parts of the measured topology by comparing such theoretical results with the actually observed data.We find that:1)for more than 90%of the monitors,the actually observed peer-peer links merely takes a small part of all theoretical visible links;2)increasing the BGP monitors in the same AS may improve the measurement result,but with limited improvement;and 3)deploying multiple BGP monitors in different ASs can significantly improve the measurement results,but non-local BGP monitors can hardly replace the local AS BGP monitors.We also propose a metric for monitor selection optimization,and prove its effectiveness with experiment evaluation.展开更多
文摘随着人们隐私保护意识的提高,匿名通信系统获得了越来越多的关注.I2P(invisible Internet project)是当前应用最广泛的匿名通信系统之一,与Tor(另一种非常流行的匿名通信系统)网络类似,I2P采用大蒜路由的方式隐藏通信双方的通信关系,即通过使用包含多个节点的隧道,使得隧道中的任意单一节点都不能同时获知通信双方的身份信息.然而,如果能够共谋同一隧道的两端节点或是能同时观察到I2P通信链路进、出I2P网络的流量,攻击者依然可以通过流量分析的方法对通信的双方进行关联,进而破坏I2P网络的匿名性.通过分别从I2P网络内部攻击者和传输路径上外部网络攻击者的角度,对当前I2P路径选择过程中可能面临的共谋攻击威胁进行分析,结果显示,I2P网络当前的路径选择算法并不能有效地防范内部攻击者和外部网络攻击者,I2P网络的匿名性仍然面临着巨大的共谋攻击威胁.
基金This work was supported in part by the Guangdong Province Key Research and Development Plan(Grant No.2019B010137004)the National Key research and Development Plan(Grant No.2018YFB0803504).
文摘BGP monitors are currently the main data resource of AS-level topology measurement,and the integrity of measurement result is limited to the location of such BGP monitors.However,there is currently no work to conduct a comprehensive study of the range of measurement results for a single BGP monitor.In this paper,we take the first step to describe the observed topology of each BGP monitor.To that end,we first investigate the construction and theoretical up-limit of the measured topology of a BGP monitor based on the valley-free model,then we evaluate the individual parts of the measured topology by comparing such theoretical results with the actually observed data.We find that:1)for more than 90%of the monitors,the actually observed peer-peer links merely takes a small part of all theoretical visible links;2)increasing the BGP monitors in the same AS may improve the measurement result,but with limited improvement;and 3)deploying multiple BGP monitors in different ASs can significantly improve the measurement results,but non-local BGP monitors can hardly replace the local AS BGP monitors.We also propose a metric for monitor selection optimization,and prove its effectiveness with experiment evaluation.
