近年来,随着美德伦理学的“复兴”,英语学界有学者提出应该以美德伦理学的视角解读笛卡尔的道德理论,其中以加拿大学者丽萨·沙皮洛(Lisa Shapiro)、巴西学者马塞洛·德·阿劳约(Marcelo de Araujo)为代表,他们认为笛卡尔...近年来,随着美德伦理学的“复兴”,英语学界有学者提出应该以美德伦理学的视角解读笛卡尔的道德理论,其中以加拿大学者丽萨·沙皮洛(Lisa Shapiro)、巴西学者马塞洛·德·阿劳约(Marcelo de Araujo)为代表,他们认为笛卡尔的德性学说是古典美德伦理学的延续,相比于现代伦理学的视角,更应该以美德伦理的立场解读。然而,通过深入考察笛卡尔的德性理论,可以发现这一立场很难成立。首先,笛卡尔虽然规定了“德性是至善”,然而这一规定的内涵是空洞的,并未像其他目的论式的美德伦理学那样给出道德判断的标准。其次,他更为在先地规定了什么是道德正当,并以此为基础定义德性,而非美德伦理学那样通过先定义德性内涵进而规定行为的道德正当。因此,笛卡尔的道德理论并不符合美德伦理学的核心规定,不能用美德伦理学简单概括。展开更多
The emergence of Large Language Models(LLMs)has renewed debate about whether Artificial Intelligence(AI)can be conscious or sentient.This paper identifies two approaches to the topic and argues:(1)A“Cartesian”approa...The emergence of Large Language Models(LLMs)has renewed debate about whether Artificial Intelligence(AI)can be conscious or sentient.This paper identifies two approaches to the topic and argues:(1)A“Cartesian”approach treats consciousness,sentience,and personhood as very similar terms,and treats language use as evidence that an entity is conscious.This approach,which has been dominant in AI research,is primarily interested in what consciousness is,and whether an entity possesses it.(2)An alternative“Hobbesian”approach treats consciousness as a sociopolitical issue and is concerned with what the implications are for labeling something sentient or conscious.This both enables a political disambiguation of language,consciousness,and personhood and allows regulation to proceed in the face of intractable problems in deciding if something“really is”sentient.(3)AI systems should not be treated as conscious,for at least two reasons:(a)treating the system as an origin point tends to mask competing interests in creating it,at the expense of the most vulnerable people involved;and(b)it will tend to hinder efforts at holding someone accountable for the behavior of the systems.A major objective of this paper is accordingly to encourage a shift in thinking.In place of the Cartesian question-is AI sentient?-I propose that we confront the more Hobbesian one:Does it make sense to regulate developments in which AI systems behave as if they were sentient?展开更多
文摘近年来,随着美德伦理学的“复兴”,英语学界有学者提出应该以美德伦理学的视角解读笛卡尔的道德理论,其中以加拿大学者丽萨·沙皮洛(Lisa Shapiro)、巴西学者马塞洛·德·阿劳约(Marcelo de Araujo)为代表,他们认为笛卡尔的德性学说是古典美德伦理学的延续,相比于现代伦理学的视角,更应该以美德伦理的立场解读。然而,通过深入考察笛卡尔的德性理论,可以发现这一立场很难成立。首先,笛卡尔虽然规定了“德性是至善”,然而这一规定的内涵是空洞的,并未像其他目的论式的美德伦理学那样给出道德判断的标准。其次,他更为在先地规定了什么是道德正当,并以此为基础定义德性,而非美德伦理学那样通过先定义德性内涵进而规定行为的道德正当。因此,笛卡尔的道德理论并不符合美德伦理学的核心规定,不能用美德伦理学简单概括。
文摘The emergence of Large Language Models(LLMs)has renewed debate about whether Artificial Intelligence(AI)can be conscious or sentient.This paper identifies two approaches to the topic and argues:(1)A“Cartesian”approach treats consciousness,sentience,and personhood as very similar terms,and treats language use as evidence that an entity is conscious.This approach,which has been dominant in AI research,is primarily interested in what consciousness is,and whether an entity possesses it.(2)An alternative“Hobbesian”approach treats consciousness as a sociopolitical issue and is concerned with what the implications are for labeling something sentient or conscious.This both enables a political disambiguation of language,consciousness,and personhood and allows regulation to proceed in the face of intractable problems in deciding if something“really is”sentient.(3)AI systems should not be treated as conscious,for at least two reasons:(a)treating the system as an origin point tends to mask competing interests in creating it,at the expense of the most vulnerable people involved;and(b)it will tend to hinder efforts at holding someone accountable for the behavior of the systems.A major objective of this paper is accordingly to encourage a shift in thinking.In place of the Cartesian question-is AI sentient?-I propose that we confront the more Hobbesian one:Does it make sense to regulate developments in which AI systems behave as if they were sentient?
