摘要
引入进口国关税,基于外国企业与进口国企业的古诺数量竞争结构,考察不同技术授权模式对外国企业利润和进口国社会福利影响,形成跨国环境下的技术授权机制分析.研究表明:固定收费方式对外国企业利润具有不确定性,但可能损害进口国社会福利;特许权收费方式增加了外国企业利润,但却在一定条件下损害了进口国社会福利;双重收费方式同时增加了外国企业利润和进口国社会福利,实现企业目标和社会目标的一致;关税水平较高时,双重收费方式可以特化为固定收费方式.
A model was set up based on Cournot quantity competition between foreign firms and local firms in considering import taxes. Through this model,the effect of the fixed-fee, royalty and two-part tariff licensing modes on the profit of foreign firms and the social welfare of import countries was analyzed to explain the mechanism of technological licensing in the transnational context. The research showed that the fixed-fee mode may make the profit of foreign firms uncertain and damage the social welfare of import countries. Royalty mode can increase the profit of foreign firms while it may decrease the social welfare under certain conditions. The two-part tariff mode can increase the profit of foreign firms and the social welfare, which realizes both the corporate and social goals. Morover, the two-part tariff mode may be specialized into the fixed- fee mode when the import tax is comparably high.
出处
《东北大学学报（自然科学版）》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2017年第9期1358-1362,共5页
Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science)
基金
中央高校基本科研业务费-研究生科研创新项目(N160606001)
关键词
跨国技术授权
进口国关税
降低成本技术
古诺竞争
社会福利
transnational licensing
import tax
cost-reduction technology
Cournot competition
social welfare
