摘要
基于自由现金流代理成本假说,本文利用我国上市公司(A股)制造业1998-2003年数据对上市公司投资行为进行实证研究。研究结果表明,(1)经理持股比例越低,代理问题越严重,投资现金流相关性越高。(2)企业融资约束程度越轻,代理问题越严重,投资现金流相关性越高,经理越容易建造“企业帝国”。具体表现为:国家股比例越高,投资现金流相关性越高;净资产税后利润率越高,投资现金流相关性越高;企业规模越大,投资现金流相关性越高。建立有效的公司治理机制可以解决有关代理问题。
Based on hypothesis of free cash flow agency costs, the author makes an empirical study of investment behavior of Chinese listed company in manufacturing industry. Studies show that 1） the smaller the managerial ownership, the bigger the agency problem and the stronger the correlation of the investment-cash flow; 2） the lighter the financing constraints, the more serious the agency problem and the stronger the correlation of investment-cash flow, the easier to build corporate imperial power. This is reflected in that the greater the state interest, the greater the correlation of investment-cash flow. The greater the post-tax profit margin, the greater the correlation of investment-cash flow. The bigger scale of a company, the greater the correlation of investment-cash flow. Therefore, sound corporate governance may help solve the agency problem.
出处
《证券市场导报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第4期62-68,共7页
Securities Market Herald
