摘要
股权质押作为一种便捷的融资方式,近些年来广受股东青睐,但其也因风险性饱受争议。本文以中国A股上市公司作为研究对象,考察了控股股东股权质押对企业并购行为的影响。研究发现,在控股股东股权质押期间,控股股东倾向于通过宣告并购行为以拉升企业股价,降低控制权转移风险。控股股东股权质押对企业并购的促进作用在非国有企业、机构投资者持股比例较低的企业中更为明显,且更有可能发生在股价下行期间,此时的并购行为呈现"重量不重质"的特点,控股股东股权质押也降低了企业并购的完成率。并购能够提高企业短期业绩,但对企业长期业绩有负面影响,企业宣告并购更多的是为了提振短期股价。本文从一个新的角度验证了控股股东股权质押对企业经营行为的实质性影响,为监管控股股东股权质押行为、控制股权质押风险提供了政策参考。
In recent years,shares pledge has become a popular financing method.Taking advantage of the shares pledge,controlling shareholders can conveniently satisfy their cash needs.However,shares pledge may also bring great risk to shareholder once the stock price touches the cordon of liquidation.In this paper,we examined the impact of controlling shareholders’shares pledge on corporate acquisitions and we arrive at the following findings.Firms with controlling shareholders pledging their shares engage in more corporate acquisitions and in a larger scale to increase share price.The relation between controlling shareholders’pledging shares and corporate acquisitions is much stronger in privately-owned firms,firms with less institutional shareholders,and only exists when the stock price is falling.However,shareholders’pledging shares also harms the completion of M&A.During the pledge of controlling shareholders’shares,short-term performance of corporate acquisition increases but shares pledge appears to harm the long-term performance of the firm.These results suggest that controlling shareholders do take actions to affect corporate investment regarding share pledge,and increasing M&A monitoring should be considered.
作者
朱雅典
才国伟
Zhu Yadian;Cai Guowei
出处
《金融学季刊》
2020年第4期1-22,共22页
Quarterly Journal of Finance
基金
教育部人文社科一般项目(19YJA790001)
国家自然科学基金面上项目(72073147)的资助
关键词
股权质押
大股东行为
投资
并购
shares pledge
controlling shareholder
investment
acquisition
