摘要
为探究不同经济发展水平县域政府能否通过合作提高收益,提升集体经营性建设用地入市积极性,基于县域政府在集体经营性建设用地入市中的作用,运用演化博弈理论,构建动态演化模型,分析集体经营性建设用地入市背景下邻近的发达县域政府和欠发达县域政府的演化稳定策略及影响因素,并进行仿真分析,展示参数变化对策略选择的影响。结果表明:县域政府在博弈过程中存在两个演化稳定策略,一是双方都选择合作,二是双方都选择不合作;县域间政府的策略选择主要取决于土地征收收益及成本、上级政府监察力度、违规惩罚力度、入市流转所带来的产业增值收益和基础设施建设投入。上级政府可以通过影响以上因素促进县域间合作。
In order to explore whether county governments at different levels of economic development can improve their income and enthusiasm for the marketization of collective-owned commercial construction land:through cooperation,based on the relationship between county governments in the marketization of collective-owned commercial construction land,this paper constructs a dynamic evolution model by using evolutionary game theory,analyzes the evolutionary stability strategies and influencing factors of developed county governments and underdeveloped county governments which are neighboring under the background of the marketization of collective-owned commercial construction land,and conduct simulation analysis to show the impact of parameter changes on strategy selection,the results show that there are two evolutionary stabilization strategies in the process of game,one is that both sides choose to cooperate and the other is that both sides choose not to cooperate.The higher-level government can promote inter-county cooperation by influencing the above factors.
作者
夏慧芳
徐士元
XIA Hui-fang;XU Shi-yuan(School of Economics and Management,Zhejiang Ocean University,Zhoushan,Zhejiang 316022)
出处
《安徽农业科学》
CAS
2022年第23期241-246,251,共7页
Journal of Anhui Agricultural Sciences
关键词
县域政府
集体经营性建设用地
入市
演化博弈
合作
County government
Collective-owned commercial construction land
Marketization
Evolutionary game
Cooperation
