摘要
员工持股计划的重新引入是我国证券市场近年来一项重要的制度探索,但其过去四年多笼罩在"浮亏"与"减持"的争议之中。本文首先将员工持股计划与实施经验较丰富的股权激励在机制设计上相比较,利用双重差分与PSM方法实证对比两种方案的激励效果及探究背后原因。实证结果发现,开展员工持股计划的公司业绩的动态变化情况不如实施股权激励的公司;限售股解禁对未来上市公司实施员工持股计划有显著的正向影响;投资者可以从员工持股计划的股票来源识别出大股东的减持动机,相较于非减持动机的员工持股计划或股权激励,裹挟着大股东自利动机的员工持股计划存在显著偏低的短期市场反应。文中研究结论对未来员工持股计划的制度设计与完善提供了经验证据,同时对大股东的"另类减持"监管提供了参考,丰富了权益薪酬契约相关领域的研究。
Re-introduction of Employee Stock Ownership Plan is a new institutional exploration in Chinese stock market. However,in last 4 years,ESOP has been mired in controversies because of the floating loss and controlling shareholder’s share selling. This paper first compares ESOP with proven equity incentives and then uses difference-in-difference matching estimators to compare different effects between the two incentive approaches and find out the underlying reasons. The results show that,firstly,firms implementing ESOPs have less improvement in financial performance compared with these employing equity incentives. Secondly,the unlocking of restricted stock has significant positive effect on the implementation of ESOP in the future. Thirdly,investors could distinguish ESOPs containing self-interest motivation of major shareholder from common ESOPs by stock resources,so such ESOPs might have a significantly downward market reaction in short term. These findings provide empirical evidences for the further improvement of ESOP’s policy design and the supervision on major shareholders’ uncommon selling approaches. These findings could enrich the studies of equity compensation contract as well.
作者
郝永亮
金昕
张永冀
Hao Yongliang;Jin Xin;Zhang Yongji(Business School,Central University of Finance and Economics,Beijing 100081;School of Statistics and Mathematics,Central University of Finance and Economics,Beijing 100081;School of Management and Economics,Beijing Institute of Technology,Beijing 100081)
出处
《管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第10期164-177,共14页
Management Review
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目(71102110)。
关键词
员工持股计划
股权激励
股东减持
大股东自利
employee stock ownership plans( ESOP)
equity incentives( EI)
shareholders’ share selling
major shareholders’ self-interest
