摘要
笔者基于经济学视角对商业贿赂盛行的原因进行剖析,构建了相应的博弈决策模型,并针对模型进行分析:一方面利用经济学中成本收益理论构建了行贿主体行为决策博弈模型和受贿主体行为决策博弈模型;另一方面,将经济学中寻租理论引入到商业贿赂成因和治理的探析中,从而提出治理商业贿赂的有效路径以及相对应的可以采取的对策。
The authors analyze the reasons for the prevalence of commercial bribery from the perspective of economics, construct a corresponding decision-making game model and make an analysis with the model. Firstly using the theory of cost and income in economics, the authors construct the game model of bribers＇ decision-making and the game model of bribees＇ decision-making; secondly the authors introduce the rent-seeking theory of economics into the exploration of the reasons for commercial bribery and its control and put forward the effective way to control commercial bribery and corresponding countermeasures.
出处
《经济经纬》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第4期118-121,148,共5页
Economic Survey
基金
陕西师范大学211重点项目"中国特色的发展经济学研究"
陕西师范大学重点项目"法律的经济学分析"(05XG219)
关键词
商业贿赂
成本收益
贿赂治理
commercial bribery
cost and income
bribery control
