摘要
本文以2007—2009年被大股东减持的深交所上市公司为样本,研究股票减持过程中的大股东掏空行为。研究发现:被减持上市公司在减持前30个交易日有显著的正累计超常收益,而在减持后30个交易日则出现显著的负累计超常收益;被减持上市公司倾向于在减持前披露好消息,或将坏消息推迟至减持后披露;减持规模越大,大股东操控上市公司信息披露的概率就越高;相比其他大股东,控股股东对上市公司信息操控更严重,获得的减持收益也更高。本文的研究证实了大股东,特别是控股股东,通过操控上市公司的重大信息披露来掏空中小股东利益的事实,为监管机构加强大股东行为的监督,提高中小投资者保护水平提供了依据。
Collecting data from listed firms in Shenzhen Stock Exchange between 2007 and 2009,this paper examines tunneling behaviors by large shareholders during their stock-selling periods.The results from our sample show that,①There are positively cumulative abnormal returns（CAR） of listed firms before large shareholders’ selling behaviors,and negatively CAR after their selling behaviors.② Large shareholders maximize their selling returns by rushing forward good news and delaying bad news.③ More selling by large shareholders,higher probability of such opportunistic information announcements by listed firms.④ Comparing with other large shareholders,controlling shareholders have higher probability of information announcements manipulation and higher selling returns during their stock-selling periods.Our findings suggest that large shareholders,especially controlling shareholders,expropriate minority shareholders by information announcements manipulation during their stock-selling behaviors.
出处
《中国工业经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第5期121-130,共10页
China Industrial Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金重点项目"公司财务管理若干基础问题研究"(批准号70632001)
关键词
“大小非”减持
大股东掏空
信息披露
内部人交易
公司治理
stock-selling behaviors
tunneling
information announcements
insider trading
corporate governance
