摘要
本文考察了我国民营上市企业所有权、控制权以及二者的分离对企业的影响。我们发现，民营上市企业的最终控制人大多采用金字塔方式从而以用较少的投资控制较多的股份。与所有权和控制权分离情况严重的东亚地区的其他9个国家和地区相比．我国民营上市企业的两权分离更大。两权的分离造成了企业价值的下降。我们的结论指出，民营企业的所有权和控制权应该尽量保持相若，且应避免所有者和管理者合一这一经营管理方式。
This paper investigates the deviation between ownership and control for private listed companies in China. It is found that firm controlling owners tend to use pyramid structure to amplify control rights without significantly increase their investment. Compared with other East Asia Economies which are well known for a significant gap between ownership and control, China has a higher level of separation. Further analysis indicates that the more ownership exceeds control, the lower the firm value. Chinese private companies also have shown to exhibit stronger monitoring effects on managers and 'tunneling' motives by controlling shareholders. Finally, this paper results in some useful policy implications.
出处
《经济学（季刊）》
2004年第B10期1-14,共14页
China Economic Quarterly
