摘要
社会主义经济中的国有企业一旦发生亏损,政府常常要追加投资、增加贷款、减少税收、并提供财政补贴,这种现象被亚诺什·科尔奈(Kornai,1986)称为“预算软约束”。究竟是什么原因导致了预算软约束的存在,是理论界争论的热点问题之一。本文分析了预算软约束现象的根源。我们认为是政策性负担而不是所有制归属导致了此现象。本文的目的在于用中国工业企业的统计资料来检验政策性负担对预算软约束的影响,以及其他竞争性理论观点的正确性和可靠性。我们的假说得到了经验证据的支持。
The phenomenon that, once a national enterprise in a socialist economy has made a loss, the government often supplements investment, increases loan, reduces taxes and provides financial subsidy is called by Kornai(1986)'budgetary soft constraint'(BSC).What is it that leads to the existence of BSC, is one of the focuses of theoretic contention. In this paper, we will analyze the origin of BSC. In our opinion, it is the policy burden and not the ownership that results in this fact. The aim of this paper is to use the statistics of China's industrial enterprises to examine the effect of the policy burden upon BSC, and sound out the correctness and reliability of other competitive theoretical point of view. And our hypothesis has enjoyed support from empirical evidence.
出处
《管理世界》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第8期81-89,127,共10页
Journal of Management World
